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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ALBERT EDMUND BARLOW, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 8533 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Albert Edmund Barlow was on the 31st day of 
October, 1955, in Salt Lake County, Utah, charged with 
the crime of unlawful cohabitation in that in Salt Lake 
County, between April 30, 1952, and October 31, 1955, 
"the said Albert Edmund Barlow, at the time and 
place aforesaid did unlawfully cohabit with more 
than one person of the opposite sex, to-wit: 
Maureen Owen, Amanda Kate Kilgrow, Vio 
Frazer". (R. 16) 
The defendant was bound over for trial upon waiver 
of preliminary hearing (R. 1), and dJfendant appeared 
for arraignment December 23, 1955 (R. 17). On Decem-
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ber 31, 1955, defendant demanded a bill of particulars 
(R. 19-20), which was furnished (R. 23-24), together with 
an amended information (R. 21-22), on the 13th day of 
January, 1956. Defendant filed a motion to quash (R. 
25-26) on four grounds on the 14th day of January, 1956, 
which was heard on the 19th day of January, 1956, and 
denied by the court. Defendant on the 21st day of Jan-
ary, 1956, entered a plea of not guilty (R. 29). The case 
came on for hearing before a jury on the 12th day of 
March, 1956. 
During the impan~lling of the jury the court denied 
a motion of the State to strike Juror McMurrin on the 
basis of .admitted prejudice (R. 47 -48) and a motion of 
defendant to strike Juror Ohran for cause on the basis 
that he had predetermined the defendant's marital status, 
an essential element of the case (R. 51-53). The court 
further denied defendant's motion to discharge the jury 
on the district attorney's voir dire ·as to plural marriage 
(R. 5±) and the district attorney's reference to the three 
women named in the information as defendant's "wives" 
(R. 50-51). The court further refused to strike for cause 
Juror Nelson on the ground that his employment arose 
directly from the L.D.S. Church (R. 61) and denied de-
fendant's challenge to the panel on the basis that ten of 
the twelve were of the L.D.S. faith (R. 62). 
The c.ase proceeded to trial after both the defendant 
and the State had exhausted their preemptory challenges. 
The State proceeded to put on its evidence, and at 2 :00 
p. m. on March 13, 1956, the defense rested. 
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The court released the jury for thirty minutes with-
out supervision after all the evidence was in, prior to 
instructions. Defendant requested Instructions Nos. 1 to 
6 inclusive (R. 2'45-252). Defendant excepted to the 
court's refusal to give requested Instruction No. 1 (R .. 
246). The court gave its instructions covering the of-
fense, together with stock instructions (R. 253-262). The 
court thereafter modified Instructions Nos. 3, 5 and 10 
(R. 234-235). The defendant excepted to the court's 
Instructions Nos. 3, 5 and 10 and the modification 
thereof (R. 235-236). The State excepted to Instructions 
Nos. 6 and 10. Arguments were presented, the jury re-
tired and returned a verdict of guilty. Defendant was 
sentenced by the court for an indefinite period not to 
exceed five years in the State prison. 
Within the time provided by law, defendant appealed 
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Albert Ed1nund Barlow married ICate Kilgrow 
(Amanda Kate Barlow) on October 23, 1922 (R. 69 and 
Exhibit 1), said marriage resulting in several children. 
Thereafter he lived with and had issue by Maurine Owen 
and Vio Fraser, the evidence not showing the beginning 
dates of either relationship. Barlow was convicted of 
unlawful cohabitation with these three women in May, 
1944, and sentenced thereon in 1945 (R. 74). At the time 
of his release from the Utah State prison on parole 
Barlow was informed by the parole Loard that he was 
under the duty to support and maintain his children (R. 
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260). At all times after Barlow's release, the three fami-
lies lived in separate and widely segregated homes. A-
manda Kate Barlow lived at 25 West 6025 South, Murray, 
Utah, in Salt Lake County (R. 78), and at Bluebell, 
Duchesne County (R. 221). Vio Fraser lived at 50 Gran-
ite Avenue, Salt Lake County (R. 195), and in Mountain 
Home, Duchesne County (R. 199). Maurine Owen lived 
at 1538 South 3d East, Salt Lake City and County, during 
the entire period (R. 183). 
Several witnesses had seen Barlow around each of 
the three homes at intervals during the period in which 
the crime is charged. With regard to 25 West 6025 South, 
see the testimony of Bruce Andreasen (R. 75-86), Shirley 
Broadbent (R. 86-95), David Eccles (R. 95-101), Alhona 
Barlow (R. 102-109), and David W. Barlow (R. 110-119). 
With regard to 1538 South 3d East, see testimony of 
Evelyn Clampitt (R. 126-144), and Annie :\I. Roll (R.159-
166), Sarah Arpin (R. 166-169), and Edmund Barlow 
(R. 170-176). With regard to 50 Granite Avenue, see 
testimony of Vio Fraser (R. 194-200) and David \Y. 
Barlow (R. 110-119). 
The testimony of the witnesses showed Barlow at 
each of the places at various times helping care for the 
premises, controlling the children, and on occasion bring-
ing groceries and supplies to the houses. With respect 
to 1538 South 3d East, the testimony of Evelyn Clampitt 
indicates Barlow dined there on occasion. 
The State produced 27 birth certificates, which were 
entered with two exceptions, upon the withdrawal of 
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objection as to materiality by the defendant. Only two 
of these birth certificates concerned children born or 
conceived within the period charged in the information, 
both of these children being born to :Maurine Owen. 
The testimony of several witnesses, including David 
W. Barlow, Arlene Mitchell and Vio Fraser, showed the 
defendant and at least two of the women with whom he is 
accused of having cohabited, to-wit, Amanda Kate Barlow 
and Vio Fraser, to have lived in Duchesne County during 
a portion of the time charged in the information and in 
different places in Duchesne County. 
The court allowed, over defendant's objection, a 
plethora of hearsay testimony by witnesses consisting 
of neighbors of the three abodes in Salt Lake County 
regarding statements made to them or overheard by 
them from the children and alleged cohabitees with the 
defendant and out of the presence of the defendant. 
The evidence shows beyond any doubt that the 
defendant continued after his former conviction to care 
for, maintain, support and educate his children, but there 
is no evidence of cohabitation or holding the three women 
set forth in the information out as wives during the 
period charged in the information. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
I 
The court erred in denying defendant's motion to 
quash and more particularly Paragraph 1: 
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"The information does not charge the defendant with 
the commission of an offense," 
and Paragraph 3: 
"That there is more than one offense charged, except 
as provided in Section 77-21-31, U. C. A., 1953, to-wit: 
'a. Cohabiting with Maurine Owen and Kate Kil-
grow during the period .alleged in the information. 
'b. Cohabiting with Maurine Owen and Vio Frazer 
during the same period. 
'c. Cohabiting with Vio Frazer and Kate Kilgrow 
during the same period.' " 
II. 
The court erred in allowing in evidence facts outside 
of the period charged in the information. 
III. 
The court erred in allowing m evidence hearsay 
statements .and conclusions arising from conversations 
not in the presence of the defendant. 
IV. 
The court erred in giving Instruction No. :2, in that 
said intruction, together with other instructions, does not 
inform the jury of the ele1nents of the crime charged. 
v. 
The court erred in giving Instruction No. 5, in that 
it is ambiguous, entirely negative, and construed together 
I 
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with Instruction No. 2 tends to confuse the jury. 
VI. 
The court erred in failing to define the word, "co-
habitation," to the jury. 
VII. 
The court erred in denying defendant's challenge for 
cause to Juror Ohran. 
VIII. 
The evidence, in view of the instructions, is insuffi-
cient to show cohabitation between defendant and any 
two of the women charged during the period set forth 
in the information. 
IX. 
The court erred in amending Instructions Nos. 3, 5 
and 10 after the original submission to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO QUASH, AND MORE PARTICULARLY PARA-
GRAPH 1 THEREOF, THAT THE INFORMATION DOES 
NOT CHARGE THE DEFENDANT WITH THE COMMISSION 
OF AN OFFENSE, AND PARAGRAPH 3, THAT THERE IS 
MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE CHARGED. (Assignment of 
Error Nos. 1 and 9). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
Said errors will be discussed separately . 
. 
A. 
The infonnation does not charge an offense in that 
the statute, Section 76-53-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
is so ambiguous and uncertain that it does not inform 
the public as to the crime it charges, nor advise the 
court in directing the trial of the matter. It is in viola-
tion of defendant's constitutional rights under Amend-
ments V and XIV of the Constitution of the United 
States. The ambiguity arises from 1he entire lack of 
a time factor. 
The section so far as is applicable to this point reads 
as follows: 
"If any person cohabits with more than one 
person of the opposite sex, such person is guilty 
of a felony." 
This court has from 1896 to the present date given 
Inany and varied definitions of the word, "cohabit," as 
used in this law, the sum and substance of them being 
to the effect that "cohabit" was intended by the legis-
lature for the purpose of this legislation to come under 
the second dictionary definition of that word, i.e., "to 
live together as man and wife; or ostensibly to hold one 
of the opposite sex out to the world as one's spouse.~' 
U. 8. vs. Gannon, 4 U. 122, 7 P. 369; 
U. 8. vs. Snow, 4 U. 295, 9 P. 686; 
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State vs. Jessup, 98 U. 482, 100 P(2) 969; 
State vs. Barlow, 107 U. 292, 153 P(2) 647; 
U. S. vs. White, 4 U. 500, 11 P. 570. 
Now here in the law itself is a time factor considered. 
There is nothing in the title nor in the body of the law 
to connote the necessity of cohabitation with more than 
one person of the opposite sex simultaneously or within 
a reasonable period of time; in fact, the only legislation 
putting a time factor to this section is the omnibus 
limitation of actions as to felonies, which makes a limita-
tion on prosecution of felonies not otherwise enumerated 
of four years. 
Let us ask: Is the person who divorces his or her 
spouse and then marries again within four years after 
living with the first spouse guilty of a felony~ He or 
she is not guilty of polygamy as the first marriage is 
ended in law prior to entering into the second, but is 
he or she not guilty of a violation of Section 76-53-2 ~ And 
what of the widow or widower who seeks solace or fi-
nancial security by a second marriage within the felony 
limitation period following the demise of the former 
spouse~ Is he or she not subject to prosecution both 
unwittingly and unknowingly~ 
This line of reasoning has theretofore been pondered 
by this court in State vs. Jessup, 98 U. 482, 100 P(2') 969, 
another Utah unlawful cohabitation case, wherein this 
court on page 971 states : 
"The definition of cohabitation given by our 
statute is so general that to limit the information 
to it, word for word, states no more than a class 
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of crimes. In fact, it is gravely questionable 
whether the statute states the offense it was in-
tended to cover. It would appear that some atten-
tion should have been given to the element of time. 
If a man marries and lives with a second wife 
after the death of, or divorce from, his first, he 
falls within the definition of the statute; yet all 
must concede that it was not the intention of the 
Legislature to make such relationships the bases 
of criminal offenses." 
The defendant in the instant case was found guilty 
under this same statute in 1944 (R. 215-217), and it is 
apparent by the finding of the jury that his efforts to 
support his children show a continuity of a holding out 
of three ostensible marital relationships ad infinitum, 
or at least until the children of at least two of the families 
are reared and no longer living with their mother. 
The court, in State vs . .Jiusser, ------------ U. ____________ , 223 
P(2) 193, quoting Justice Jackson in ~fusser et al. vs. 
State of Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 68 Sup. Ct. 397, 92 L. ed. 562 
states: 
"Legislation nwy run afoul of the due process 
clause because it fails to gi,~e adequate guidance 
to those who would be law-abiding to advise de-
fendants of the nature of the offense "ith which 
they are charged or to guide courts in trying those 
who .are accused." 
In that case also, the 1natter arising from an un-
lawful cohabitation and teaching of polygmny situation, 
the court held that our conspiracy law. Section 76-11-1(5), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, was void for vagueness 
and uncertainty, and that it did not inform people 
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under the jurisdiction of that law as to what constituted 
the crime of conspiracy. The instant statute would 
appear to be even more vague and uncertain in that it 
in no way whatsoever informs the public nor any of them 
as to the time element, if any, intended by the legislature 
during which a person could hold out only one person 
of the opposit1e sex to be his spouse. 
The question would appear to be whether the statute 
is so vague and ambiguous and indefinite that it fails to 
define the offense attempted to be charged, and to give 
reasonable standardR for determining by the publie 
the nature of the crime they are prohibited from 
violating, and by the court ,as a guide for determination 
of guilt. Can it be said in view of the wording of Section 
76-53-2 that a person living with one person of the 
opposite sex in 1952 and with another in 1955 is not 
guilty of an offense, while a person, regardless of marital 
status, who holds one person of the opposite sex out 
to be his or her spouse in January of a given year and 
holds ,another out as his or her spouse in December of 
the same year is guilty? l\fust the cohabitation be simul-
taneous, concurrent, or is a holding out to the world of 
two persons as spouses sufficient any time within the 
four-year limitation period whether concurrent, within a 
short period of time, or separated by three years and 
eleven months 1 The statute gives no guide or limitation 
whatsoever. 
B. 
Defendant further contends ti~at the amended 
information (R. 21-22) and the bill of particulars (R. 23-
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24) charge the defendant in one count with the commis-
sion of three separate and distinct crimes, to-wit: 
a. Cohabiting during the period charged with 
Amanda Kate Barlow and Maurine Owen; 
b. Cohabiting during the period charged with 
Amanda Kate Barlow and Vio Fraser; 
c. Cohabiting during the period charged with 
Maurine Owen and Vio Fraser. 
And the court by its amendments to Instruction No. 
3, subparagraph 1: 
"That on and between April30, 1952, and the 
31st day of October, 1955, Albert Edmund Barlow 
did cohabit with more than one person of the 
opposite sex, to-wit, with any two or more of the 
following: Maurine Owen, Amanda Kate Kil-
grow, and Vio Fraser" (R. 234 and 254), 
and Instruction No. 10 (R. 258), where the court amended 
the instruction by adding, ••any two or more of the 
three women," to the original instruction, thereby liter-
ally and concisely instructing the jury that it need not 
find the defendant guilty of cohabiting with three women 
as charged in the information, but of cohabiting with any 
two of said three. 
The court further in its verdict (R. 261-262) does 
not set out guilty of cohabiting with A and B, A and C, or 
B and C, but 1nerely guilty as charged, or, in the alterna-
tive, not guilty, thereby affirn1ing defendant's contention 
on his motion to quash that there is more than one 
crime charged. 
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This is in effect a method of procedure wherein the 
State charges: "We accuse the defendant of breaking 
the law by cohabiting with A, B, and C, etc. We do not 
know which of the women he cohabited with, but if we 
prove to your satisfaction that he cohabited with any 
two of the women set forth in the information during the 
three years period charged (and that cohabitation need 
not cover the same period), you may find him guilty as 
charged." 
Section 77-21-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, entitled 
"Joinder of Offenses," states: 
"The information or indictment must charge 
but one offense, but the same offense may be set 
forth in different forms under different counts; 
and when the offense may be committed by the 
use of different means, the means may be alleged 
in the alternative in the same count; provided, that 
an information or indictment for larceny may con-
tain also a count for obtaining money by false pre-
tenses, a count for embezzlement, and .a count 
for receiving or buying stolen property, knowing 
it to be stolen; that an information or indictment 
for forgery may contain .a count for uttering a 
forged instrument, knowing it to be a forgery; 
that an information or indictment for rohbery may 
contain a count for larceny; that an information 
or indictment for burglary may contain a count 
for housebreaking and one for larceny, and an 
information or indictment for housebreaking may 
contain a count for larceny; that an information 
or indictment for rape may contain a count for 
carnal knowledge of a female under eighteen years 
of age, and that an information or indictment for 
rape or assault with intent to commit r.ape, or 
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carnal knowledge of a female under eighteen years 
of age, or attempt to commit the crime of carnal 
knowledge of a female under eighteen years of 
age, or crime against nature upon .any person, or 
attempt to commit the crime against nature upon 
any person, may contain also a count for indecent 
assault." 
It will be noted that the situation at hand does not 
come within the exceptions listed supra nor is the 
information drawn in more than one count. In State vs. 
Jensen, 74 U. 527, 536, 280 P. 1046, this court goes so far 
as to hold: 
"Under this section, where two or more 
offenses arise from the same transaction, each 
punishable as a separate crime, whether all arise 
from a single act or from successive parts of a 
whole transaction, they cannot be joined unless 
permitted by an exception to the prohibition 
against uniting the offenses or unless they bear 
the relation of a lesser involved to a greater 
offense, or the component parts of the crime 
sought to be charged are themselves crimes." 
The situation in the instant case purporting to arise 
from various transactions connected only b~~ the alleged 
presence of the defendant at each transaction must con-
stitute three possible criines, .and all transactions are set 
forth in one count in the infor1nation in distinct violation 
of Section 77-21-31. 
It is plain that under the infonnation in the instant 
case upon such a finding the jur~~, if there had been 
proper evidence, could haYe detern1ined that the defend-
ant cohabited with one of the w01nen without cohabitation 
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with either one of the other two of the women, or that 
he cohabited with any two of the women with the third 
not being necessary to the c.ase at all. The question arises 
in one's mind after a thorough reading of the information 
and the instructions of the court, did the jury find 
Albert Edmund Barlow guilty of cohabiting with all 
three of the women in the information or with only two 
of them, and, if so, which two~ 
The writer urges that the information contains a 
joinder expressly prohibited by Section 77-21-31, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, and that the court's denial of 
defendant's motion to quash was reversible error. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE TO JUROR OHRAN. (Assignment 
of Error No. 7). 
In questioning the jury panel on voir dire, Juror 
Ohran stated he was acquainted with the defendant and 
defendant had worked for him (R. 39). Later on voir 
dire on the district attorney's questioning of Juror Ohran 
regarding his knowledge of defendant and his family life, 
Juror Ohran by his answers explicitly admitted a pre-
conceived opinion as to defendant's marital status: 
"MR. ANDERSON: Further, Your Honor, 
I would like know whether or not Mr. Ohran who 
apparently has had some acquaintance with the 
defendant, during that acquaintance became fami-
liar with any of the circumstances relating to Mr. 
Barlow and his family life that might in any way 
affect his judgment, one way or the other~ 
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"MR. ORRAN: No, I didn't know at that 
time. Since that time and I guess I have been a 
little .acquainted with it we have had a girl who 
is in a similar circumstance work for us and talked 
about it" (R. 51). 
On the basis of this answer, defendant challenged for 
cause on the ground of preconceived opinion. The follow-
ing questions and answers followed: 
"THE COURT: Mr. Ohran, do you have any 
knowledge that you would act upon in the trial of 
this matter, independent from what the evidence 
might or might not show~ 
"MR. ORRAN: No. I stated I would judge it 
on the weight of the evidence, but I do have that 
knowledge of several people. 
"THE COURT: Whatever knowledge you 
have in reference to Mr. Barlow is through hear-
say and gossip that you may have heard~ 
"MR. ORRAN: And what I have read in the 
papers. 
"THE COURT: And what you have read 
in the papers~ 
"MR. ORRAN: Yes. 
"THE COURT: And at this time do you still 
indulge, so far as he is concerned, in the presump-
tion of innocence and presun1e that he is innocent 
until he would be proven guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt~ 
.. 1\fH. OHRAN: Oh, I think I would. 
"THE COURT: Well, I mean is your feeling 
towards l\Ir. Barlow at this time that he is pre-
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sumed innocent until he is proven guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt~ 
"MR. ORRAN: Yes. I would judge that. 
"MR. HATCH: I would ask the Court to ask 
Mr. Ohran if prior to this time he has formed an 
opinion as to Mr. Barlow's present marital status~ 
"MR. ORRAN: No. Just what has been in 
the paper. I think every informed person in read-
ing it they assume that there is something con-
nected to it. 
"THE COURT: Well, Mr. Ohran, you have 
served as a juror here many times, haven't you, in 
criminal cases~ 
"MR. ORRAN: Yes sir. 
"THE COURT: And you have heard my 
statement to the effect that the fact the defend-
ant is charged by the information of the District 
Attorney is no evidence of his guilt. Would you 
treat Mr. Barlow with that legal proposition in 
this matter~ 
"MR. ORRAN: I think I would. 
"THE COURT: And the fact that he has 
been charged you would not assume from that, 
that that was any evidence of his guilt or that 
he was guilty~ 
"MR. ORRAN: No. 
"MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, the State 
would resist the challenge that was made. Of 
course we would leave it up to Your Honor but I 
think in fairness I should state that. 
"MR. HATCH: I should like to ask him one 
more question. 
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"THE COURT: You may. 
"MR. HATCH: On what basis do you make 
the statement 'That we had a girl working that 
was in a similar position or condition' if you have 
formed no opinion~ 
"MR. ORRAN: Well this girl's husband was 
put in jail for that about two months ago. 
"MR. HATCH: On the basis of that state-
ment I will renew my motion to challenge for 
cause. 
"THE COURT: Mr. Ohran if you were in the 
position of this defendant and the State of Utah 
would you be willing to submit your case to eight 
men like yourself~ 
"MR. ORRAN: I think I would. 
"THE COURT: I don't think he shows any 
impartiality" (R. 52-53). 
The court denied the challenge by the words, "I 
don't think he shows any impartiality" (R. 53). The chal-
lenge was n1ade not on the basis that the juror was 
partial, prejudiced or biased, but on the basis he had 
formed an opinion of the defendant's family situation 
prior to trial, and that opinion was an opinion of guilt, 
as evidenced by the following questions .and answers: 
"MR. HATCH: On what basis do you make 
the statement 'That we had a girl wori\:ing that 
was in a similar position or condition' if you have 
formed no opinion 1 
"MR. ORRAN: Well this girl's husband was 
put in jail for that about two months ago" (R. 53). 
There.after the jury "~as impanelled after defendant 
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had exhausted all his preemptory challenges, and Mr. 
Ohran was a member of that jury. 
Section 77-30-19(8), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
states: 
"A challenge for implied bias may be taken 
for all or any of the following causes, and for 
no other : * * * 
"(8) Having formed or expressed an unquali-
fied opinion or belief as to whether the defendant. 
is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." 
The defendant contends that in the voir dire set 
forth supra the juror, Ohran, showed an unqualified 
opinion that the defendant was "in the same situation 
as the husband of the girl working for him who had 
been put in jail for that .about two months ago." While 
the juror does not say in so many words that he is of the 
opinion that the defendant is guilty, he indicates he has 
a girl working for him in the same situation. The court 
expresses the point at Record 53, line 27, where he states: 
"I don't think he shows any impartiality," when the entire 
substance and value of our system of trial by jury is 
the selection of jurors who show an extreme degree of 
impartiality. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 
2 AND 5, AND IN FAILING TO DEFINE THE WORD, "CO-
HABITATION," TO THE JURY. (Assignments Nos. 4, 5 and 6). 
The court in instructing the jury as to the elements 
and nature of the crime of unlawful cohabitation sets 
forth in Instruction No. 2: 
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"For the purpose of this c.ase unlawful cohabi-
tation is defined as follows : If any person co-
habits with more than one person of the opposite 
sex such person is guilty of a felony" (R. 254), 
and in Instruction No. 3, paragraph 1, uses the wording, 
"did unlawfully cohabit with more than one person of 
the opposite sex, to-wit: with two or more of the follow-
ing," and then goes on in Instruction No. 5 with its only 
attempt at definition of the word, "cohabit," wherein it 
states: 
"You are instructed that the gist of the 
offense charged of unlawful cohabitation is 
proved by facts showing a course of conduct, 
upon the part of the defendant with more than 
one person of the opposite sex, that to all outward 
appearances convinces beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the parties are living together as husband 
and wife, and that holding more than one woman 
out to the world as his wife is sufficient to consti-
tute the offense. And it is not a necessary ele-
ment of such proof to show sexual intercourse, nor 
actual attempted marriage, but such matters may 
be considered by the jury in making a determina-
tion of the facts, if shown by the evidence. 
"To be cohabitating it is not necessary that 
the man actually dwell with the women, nor is it 
necessary that he take his meals with her, nor 
is it necessary that they be under the same roof, or 
live in the same house, or that he see her a certain 
number of days or nights, nor is cohabitation 
proven by a nwre showing of isolated or 
occasional acts of sexual 1nisconduct * * *" 
The effect of these instructions is to purportedly 
inform the jury of what unlawful cohabitation is, the 
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court in Instruction No. 2 stating that the crime is 
"any person who unlawfully cohabits with two or more 
persons of the opposite sex." Then the court goes for-
ward in defining unlawful cohabitation in a manner 
which is entirely negative, which sets forth what is not 
necessary to show unlawful cohabitation, but nowhere 
defines the word, "cohabit," or "cohabitation," and 
nowhere sets forth the affirmative elements, if any, 
necessary to constitute cohabitation. 
This court and the territorial court before it have 
defined the word, "cohabit," in various ways, the number 
of definitions being almost coextensive with the number 
of illegal cohabitation actions before this court. The sum 
and substance of the impression left from reading all 
of these cases indicate "cohabit," as the legislature 
intended its use in the statute on which the information 
in this case arises, was meant to live together as man 
and wife, or to ostensibly hold one of the opposite sex 
out to the world as one's spouse. 
The court in the case at bar states in Instruction 
No. 5 (R. 256): 
"And it is not a necessary element of such 
proof to show sexual intercourse, nor actual at-
tempted marriage, but such matters may be con-
sidered by the jury in making a determination of 
the facts, if shown by the evidence. 
"To be cohabitating it is not necessary that 
the man actually dwell with the women, nor is 
it necessary that he take his meals with her, nor 
is it necessary that they be under the same roof, 
or live in the same house, or that he see her a 
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certain number of days or nights, nor is cohabi-
tation proven by a mere showing of isolated or 
occasional acts of sexual misconduct." 
The portions of Instruction No. 5, together with In-
struction No. 2, set forth to the jury what cohabitation 
is not, but reading Instruction No.5 by itself and Instruc-
tion No. 2 by itself, or the instructions as a whole, it 
is impossible to determine what unlawful cohabitation is, 
and from what proof or evidence it may be found. 
The court in Instruction No. 3, paragraph 1, which is 
the first element of the crime, requires the jury to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Albert Edmund Barlow 
did unlawfully cohabit with more than one person of the 
opposite sex during the period charged, which constitutes 
merely a rewording together with dates and the name 
of the defendant of the language of the statute set forth 
in Instruction No. 2. Instructions Nos. 6, 7 and 8 im-
plicity set forth that the .act of a person in carrying 
forward his legal and moral duty of caring for and 
assisting in the upbringing and support of his children 
does not constitute illegal cohabitation nor in itself evi-
dence thereof. 
Defendant contends, despite the language of State 
vs. Barlow, 107 U. 292, 153 P(2) 6-!7, at page 651, citing 
U. 8. vs. llfusser .and several other cohabitation cases 
under tlw Ed1nunds Act, that the word, "cohabit," as used 
in our statut(' is a technical word and not a word of gen-
eral usage. It is a technieal word in that it was placed in 
the statute and the f'tatnte was passed for the admitted 
purpose of stamping out the practice of polygamy within 
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the Territory and later the State. The trial court has 
seen fit to define the word, "cohabit," rather than to 
stand on the words of the statute, and in doing so gave 
Instruction No. 5. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 
Martin vs. State, 289 P. 787, holds the definition of an 
offense in a charge must inform the jury what facts are 
necessary to justify a conviction. Instruction No. 5 
merely tends to confuse the jury by stating what facts 
are not necessary to show cohabitation. 
The Supreme Court of Nevada in State vs. Green, 202 
P. 368, states: 
"Instructions should be so unequivocal that a 
jury of laymen can experience no doubt as to their 
significance." 
The Supreme Court of Idaho in State vs. Wheeler, 
220 P(2) 687, states: 
"Instruction that is apt to confuse jury or re-
quires an involved explanation and is ambiguous 
should not be given." 
We contend that the court having chosen to define 
"cohabitation" and by doing so in a negative aspect 
is bound by its instructions, and Instruction No. 5, to-
gether with Instruction No. 2, Instruction No. 3, para-
graph 1, and Instructions Nos. 6, 7 .and 8, has so confused 
the jury that the layman can experience nothing but 
doubt as to the significance of the words, the facts and 
the evidence necessary to prove them. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING IN EVIDENCE 
TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS OUTSIDE THE PERIOD 
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CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION, AND IN ALLOWING 
TESTIMONY BASED ON HEARSAY AND CONCLUSIONS. 
(Assignments of Error Nos. 2 and 3). 
A. 
The court erred in allowing in evidence testimony 
and exhibits outside the period charged in the informa-
tion. The information as amended charges defendant 
with the crime of illegal cohabitation between the dates 
of April 30, 1952, and October 31, 1955 (R. 21), and the 
court in its Instruction No. 10 instructs the jury: 
"You are instructed that the conduct of the 
defendent and other persons showing his re-
lationship, if any, to Kate Amanda Kilgrow, 
Maurine Owen .and Vio Fraser, between the dates 
set forth in the information is the onl:T evidence 
that may be considered by you in this matter, and 
evidence of cohabitation or lack thereof during 
any other period is incompetent and immaterial, 
and that unless you find the defendant to have co-
habited with any two or more of the three women 
set forth in the information betu·een the dates set 
forth in the information, you must find the de-
fendant not guilty." 
Despite the limitation and the wording of Instruc-
tion No. 10, the court allowed in evidence over the objec-
tion of defendant the following docun1ents and testimony 
relative to said docun1ents: 
1. Exhibit 36, a school census card containing 
alleged birth dates of nine children outside of the period 
charged, this evidence being also secondary evidence 
based on hearsay as discussed in Part B of this point 
(R. 157-158), and duly objected to by defendant. 
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2. Exhibits 37 and 38, school census cards contain-
ing information which is wholly outside of the period 
charged in the information, the lastest date thereon being 
April 20, 1952, also over the objection of defendant (R. 
189). 
3. Exhibit 39, medical records and testimony re-
lative to said records (R. 204-205) over the objection of 
defendant, although seven of the eight pages of this 
exhibit refer to times and dates outside of the period 
charged, and sheet number one of the exhibit is imma-
terial as to the defendant. Further, with the exception of 
testimony reg.arding visits to children of the defend-
ant by the defendant at 50 Granite Avenue, Exhibit 39, 
together with Exhibits 37 and 38 (school census reports 
discussed in 2 above), there is nothing in the record to 
connect the defendant with Vio Fraser during the period 
charged. 
4. The court allowed Mrs. Annie Roll to testify with 
reference to the wives of the defendant and conversations 
relative thereto over the objection of the defendant (R. 
161-163), and relating to times outside the period charged 
in the information by sever.al years. 
B. 
The court admitted hearsay evidence and conclusion 
evidence over the objections of the defendant that was 
prejudicial to the defendant. 
Despite the court's Instruction No. 10 and the objec-
tions of the defendant, the court allowed much evidence 
consisting of hearsay and conclusions. While instances of 
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such evidence run all through the record, the following 
examples are outstanding: 
1. At page 88 of the record and subsequent thereto, 
the court allowed the witness, Shirley Broadbent, to 
testify regarding a conversation with a child as to a 
genealogical report and as to whom the child considered 
its mother and father, despite the fact that the child 
was born prior to B.arlow's incarceration in 1945 as 
stipulated by counsel. 
2. The court admitted Exhibit 15, the copy of a birth 
certificate of a female child dated March 13, 1955, over 
the objection of the defendant (R. 147-149), although 
testimony of Doctor Andresen (R. 147-149) indicates that 
information thereon as to the parents of the child 
was obtained from a person or persons other than the 
defendant. Quoting from the record: 
"Q. At that time did you have occasion to 
talk with the defendant concerning the paternity 
and maternity of this .child~ 
"A. No. While waiting-" 
3. The court allowed l\[rs. Arpin (R. 167 -168) to 
testify as to knowing the children from hearing their 
mother call then1, and further to testify as to the name 
of the mother from what she had heard the mother called 
not in the presence of the defendant, .all over the objec-
tion of the defendant. 
4. The court. over the objection of the defendant, 
admitted Exhibit 36, a school census card (R. 157-158), 
despite the fact that the infonnation thereon was ob-
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tained by a conversation with a person other than the 
defendant and not in the defendant's presence: 
"Q. Now did you have occasion to speak 
with onyone at the home in order to obtain the 
information contained on Exhibit 36 ~ 
"A. Well, I spoke to Mrs. Barlow. 
"Q. And did you obtain the information con-
tained on the card, Exhibit 36, from Mrs. Barolw~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And what was the first name of the Mrs. 
Barlow to whom you spoke~ 
"A. Maurine. 
"Q. And what information did you obtain 
from her at that time~ 
"MR. HATCH: Objection as hearsay not in 
the presence of the defendant, Your Honor. 
"THE COURT: Well is it different than 
what is on this card~ 
"Q. No. We will offer the card, Exhibit 36. 
Now have you had opportunity to see it, Mr. 
Hatch~ 
"MR. HATCH: I have had opportunity to see 
it, yes. 
"Q. We will offer Exhibit 36. 
"MR. HATCH: I object to it as being hear-
say, a matter obtained from .a person not the 
defendant and put on the card. 
"Q. We think, Your Honor-
" TI-lE COURT: May I see the card~ 
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"Q. We think it is a fact as explained during 
this mornings session -
"THE COURT : The objection will be over-
ruled. It will be received in evidence. 
"Q May it be shown to the jury, Your 
Honor f That is all we have of this witness" (R. 
157-158). 
The above exhibits and testimony, which the defend-
ant insists were improperly allowed to go to the jury, 
were highly prejudicial, and had the effect of giving 
to the jury for consideration facts which arose in some 
cases years prior to the period charged in the informa-
tion, which the jury could not help but consider with the 
evidence submitted as to the defendant's association with 
his children during the period charged, and thereby infer 
a relationship with the women named in the information 
which is in no way confirmed by the evidence. 
The court further, by inconsistencies in its ruling as 
to materiality of evidence arising from the linritation 
dates set forth in the information, and in the court's 
Instruction No. 10, confused the jury as to what it may 
or may not consider. For example, on page 125 of the 
record the court in the following language sustained de-
fendant's objection to all the birth certificates prior to 
the first date charged in the information: 
"MR. HATCH: Your Honor, I must renew 
my objections to its Inateriality. All of these birth 
certificates whirh 1\fr. Anderson just handed me 
are dates previous to the prior conviction in 
this matter. I think that has already been de-
termined and is immaterial to this case as not 
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being in the period charged, or as evidence pro-
bative to the period charged. 
"THE COURT: I think that objection is well 
taken and I have that in mind on your other ex-
hibit, Mr. Anderson, that any of those that are 
prior to April 30th, 1952, at least, as to the birth 
of the child named I believe are immaterial. 
"MR. ANDERSON: Well we seek, Your 
Honor, by proferring those, we have withdrawn 
those which the evidence does not show were resid-
ing at the homes mentioned during the period 
charged in the Information. We have done that. 
We feel that with respect to the balance of the 
birth certificates the evidence that these are the 
children of these women and the evidence that 
these children were living there that the birth 
certificates are some evidence from which an 
inference could be drawn that a relationship of 
mother and child continued during the period in 
question. 
"THE COURT: Well as far as these exhibits 
that you have just mentioned and those you had 
this morning that I took under advisement I'm 
going to sustain Mr. Hatch's objection to all of 
those which bear a date of birth of the child 
named therein earlier than April 30th, 1952. The 
others I will still retain my ruling as a matter of 
advisement to determine on this prima facie 
showing that he seeks to make" (R. 125). 
and then at page 189 of the record overrules defendant's 
objections and admits documents referring to a date 
earlier than April 30, 1952, thereby implying to the jury 
that they may consider any and all evidence and nulli-
fying the effect of all admonitions of the court striking 
<: r!:,· te3timony or part of the record. 
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POINT V. 
THE EVIDENCE, IN VIEW OF THE COURT'S IN-
STRUCTIONS, IS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW COHABITA-
TION BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND ANY TWO OF 
THE WOMEN NAMED IN THE INFORMATION DURING 
THE PERIOD SET FORTH IN THE INFORMATION. 
(Assignment of Error No. 8). 
The relationship of father and child between the 
defendant and the children shown in the evidence in 
this case is admitted. The court in Instruction No. 6 
(R. 257), Instruction No. 7 (R. 257), Instruction No. 8 
(R. 257), and Instruction No. 9 (R. 258), instructed the 
jury that neither the relationship between father and 
children nor the efforts of the defendant to carry forth 
the duties and obligations both legal and moral arising 
from this relationship is any part of cohabitation, nor 
in itself evidence thereof. 
It has been stipulated that the defendant, Albert 
Edmund Barlow, "·as convicted of illegal cohabitation 
with the three women named in the instant information 
in 1944, and was incarcerated for his crime in 1945. The 
court instructed the jury in Instruction X o. 10 (discussed 
supra) that the conduct of the defendant and others be-
tween the dates set forth in the inforn1ation is the only 
evidence that n1ay be considered in this matter. 
Considering the record as a whole, in view of these 
instructions, there is little or no evidence showing a 
course of conduct between the defendant and the w01nen 
in the information or an~· of then1 on which the jury 
could 1uake a finding of cohabitation, especially in view 
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of the negative aspects of the court's attempted defi-
nition of the crime in Instructions Nos. 2 and 5. 
True, there is abundant evidence of continual efforts 
by the defendant to support and instruct his children, to 
provide a place for them to live, but there is no evidence 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a pre-
ponderance that the defendant was cohabiting with two 
or more of the women named in the information. 
With regard to Amanda Kate Barlow, the testimony 
of Bruce Andresen (R. 75-86), Shirley Broadbent (R. 86-
95), Alhona Barlow (R. 102-109), and David Barlow (R. 
110-120), shows the defendant to have been frequently on 
or ne.ar the premises at 44 West 6025 South, Murray, 
Utah, and shows the children at that address to have 
been the children of the defendant, but shows no connec-
tion whatsoever between Albert Edmund Barlow and 
Amanda Kate Barlow who resided at that address during 
all or any p,art of the period charged in the information. 
The testimony of David Eccles (R. 95-101) shows 
Mr. Barlow to have been interested in the house, which 
was purchased by Wolrab, Inc., and that Amanda Kate 
Barlow was the president of W olrab, Inc. 
With respect to Maurine Owen and the premises at 
1538 South 4th E.ast, the testimony of Evelyn Clampitt 
(R. 126-145) shows the defendant to have been at the 
home at 1538 South 4th East at infrequent intervals, 
assisting in the repair of the premises and directing and 
supervising the children, and on occasion eating there. 
The only two times that the defendant is connected with 
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Maurine Owen were, on one occasion when he rode with 
them to the hospital (R. 129), and another occasion when 
Mr. Barlow was called to the house due to the fact that 
one of the children (a 13-year old boy) had broken or 
injured his arm (R. 140). 
Doctor Carl Andreasen testified (R. 146-150) as to 
being present when the defendant was there at the time 
of a birth, but testified he had no conversation with 
the defendant (R. 147). 
The testimony of Francis Stokes Zitting (R. 150-
152) showed no connection between the defendant and 
Maurine Owen during the period charged. The testimony 
of Annie Timms and Barbara J\icMillen (R. 152-158) 
showed taking of school census reports, the admissibility 
of which is discussed in a previous point in this brief 
showing nine of the birthdates thereon to be outside of 
the period charged. The testimony of Annie Roll (R. 
159-166), Sarah Arpin (R. 166-170), Edmund Barlow 
(R. 170-176), shows no connection between Maurine 
Owen and the defendant during the period charged, ·with 
the exception of visits by the defendant to 1538 South 
4th East to look after the welfare and upbringing of 
the children and occasional n1eals. 
The testimony of Maurine Owen (R. 177 -187) is to 
the effect that she was the mother of the children living 
at that address and that Barlow had atte1npted to sup-
port the children although :Maurine was largely self-sup-
porting-, that he called around to assist in the support 
and upbringing of the children during the period charged, 
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but showing no evidence of cohabitation during the period 
charged other than support and upbringing of the chil-
dren. 
With respect to Vio Fraser, the testimony of Anna 
Johnson (R. 187-188) and Ruth Johanson (R. 188-189), 
shows a school census enumeration with all birthdates 
being outside the dates charged in the information. The 
testimony of Maxine Christensen (R. 189-191), Susan 
Barlow (R. 191-194), and Vio Fraser (Barlow) (R. 194-
200), shows visitations by the defendant to 50 Granite 
Avenue at intervals during the period charged for the 
purposes of upkeep of the premises, providing support 
for the children, but shows no connection between Vio 
Fraser and the defendant for the period charged other 
than support of children conceived and born prior to the 
period charged. 
The testimony of Betty Maack (R. 201-203), Frances 
Willey (R. 203-205), and Virginia Wallgren (R. 206-207) 
identifies certain hospital records discussed prior hereto 
in this brief, all of which are outside the period charged. 
The evidence of all the witnesses, together with the 
evidence by defense witnesses, Herbert Maw (R. 214-
218) and Arlene Mitchell (R. 218-226) shows a continued 
effort by the defendant to support the children conceived 
and born outside the period with which defendant is 
charged with cohabitation, but shows no evidence what-
soever of cohabitation between the defendant and any 
of the three women, with the exception of birth of chil-
dren to Maurine Owen as evidenced by EXhibit 15. How-
ever, the evidence is such that the admission of evidence 
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outside the period charged and the period barred by the 
statute of limitations makes it such that the defendant is 
prejudiced by a jury's inability to ignore the admitted 
three-family status of the defendant in years prior to the 
period charged, and the defendant is convicted solely 
upon his efforts to care for the children he was instru-
mental in bringing into this world prior to the period 
charged in the information. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant contends that it is apparent from a 
review of the record and the discussion of Points 1 to 5, 
covering nine assignments of error, that Albert Edmund 
Barlow was convicted of an offense that is unconstitu-
tional due to the ambiguous nature of the statute under 
which he is charged, as discussed in Part A of Point 1; 
also, that the defendant has been convicted of one and 
possibly more of three crimes attempted to be charged in 
one count, in definite 'iolation of Section 77-21-31, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953: that he was tried before a jury 
containing one n1ember who b~T his own statements had a 
preconceived opinion as to defendant's guilt: that the 
jury wa~ instructed in such a n1anner that on reading the 
instructions as a whole a la~7Jnan could haYe no idea of 
what the eharge consisted of. and n1ust necessarily from 
tlw language of the instructions be confused as to what 
constitutes cohabitation, and therefore .as to what consti~ 
tutes illegal cohabitation: that the jur~T was further 
allowed over objections of the defendant to hear evidence 
aml to PxmninP documents whieh tended to show a 
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relationship between the defendant and the women 
charged in the information at times far removed from 
the period of April 30, 1952, to October 31, 1955, and 
were then instructed that the only evidence they could 
consider was evidence within the period charged. They 
were further instructed that evidence of a father-child 
relationship and evidence of the father's attempts to 
support, advise and contribute to the rearing of the 
children was not in itself any indication of the relation-
ship between the defendant and the mother of the chil-
dren, testimony as to the father-child relationship consti-
tuting a great part of the entire record. 
The defendant contends: 
1. That he was convicted under an invalid statute. 
2. That he was tried before a jury, a member of 
which had expressed a preconceived opinion of the de-
fendant's guilt not arising from the evidence. 
3. That the defendant was tried on three crimes un-
lawfully charged under one information, and in a single 
count, and that the verdict does not apprise the defendant 
as to whether he was convicted of cohabitation with all 
the women, with any two of the women, or with which 
two of the women. 
4. That the instructions read as a whole, and more 
particularly those instructions discussed in Point 1-B, 
Point 3 and Point 5 of this brief when considered as a 
whole, as the jury was instructed to do, could only tend 
to confuse the jury as to what proof or evidence was 
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necessary to show cohabitation with any of the women 
named in the information or with all of them. 
5. That the jury was .allowed to hear and consider 
evidence, both oral and documentary, which was so far 
removed from the crime charged that it was immaterial; 
that such evidence was prejudicial to defendant, tending 
to show an unlawful relationship at a time other than the 
time charged; that without such evidence there was no 
evidence upon which the jury could determine a verdict 
of guilt. 
Defendant contends that if this court determines the 
statute is unconstitutional as set forth in Point 1 of this 
brief, the matter must be reversed and dis1nissed, and if 
the court determines that the defendant was charged "ith 
more than one crime, or was tried before a prejudiced 
jury, or that the jury was not properly instructed, or 
that the court allowed innnaterial and prejudicial evi-
dence to be considered by the jury, that the matter 
must be reversed and remanded for new trial with 
instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SUniNER J. HATCH 
RAY S. ~IcCARTY 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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